Abstract: New generation trade agreements reach far behind borders, affecting many areas of domestic policy not previously associated closely with trade. One of the most uneasy of these areas is intellectual property, particularly patent monopolies. The USA has been a major force behind the extended reach of patent monopolies using preferential trade agreements. The patent and data exclusivity provisions of the AUSFTA were proposed by the USA. This paper provides detailed evidence about how such 'TRIPS+' policies compare to a balanced patent policy -one equally favouring creators and users of technology. Australia has never had an active patent agenda, but since AUSFTA has been willing to accept in its bilateral and regional trade deals highly prescriptive rules that tie the hands of future governments. The overall trend has thus been towards increasing imbalance, with Australian patent policy now having a very broad reach and very low eligibility standards. This particularly affects the cost of medicines, where large numbers of relatively uninventive patents surround a blockbuster drug and delay the market entry of generic alternatives. In addition to outlining the costs of Australia's current patent policy approach, the paper concludes by highlighting a more balanced and less costly way forward.
Introduction
AUSFTA is a new generation comprehensive trade agreement that goes well beyond tariffs and tariff barriers. The new agenda items were mostly proposed by the USA, which had already negotiated several such agreements. For Australia it was newer territory. Some of the non-trade items -such as greatly extended copyright terms and linking patents with data protection -were highly controversial. There was less public discussion of the patent provisions. Property Rights (TRIPS) was largely proposed by a small number of global companies whose profits were highly dependent on copyright and patent policy (Drahos 2002; Sell 2003) . These interest groups failed to achieve their full agenda in TRIPS. Shortly after the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, the US began negotiating a series of preferential trade agreements, all including substantially greater provisions on patents (Drahos 2001 ; Sell 2011). These agreements cover only a small proportion of US trade, and are mostly with small or low income countries. 1 The most significant of these is AUSFTA. Although Australia counts for only one percent of US trade, its status as a long-established high-income country was important for legitimizing the US patent agenda.
The purpose of this paper is to assess the AUSFTA patent and data protection provisions against the background of the kind of patent policy that would most benefit Australians and Australian inventors.
TRIPS mandates that the needs of both creators and users of technology be balanced in a manner that benefits society as a whole (Article 7). However the proponents of the TRIPS+ patent agenda represent only the interests of patent holders. The language in which their pro-patent proposals is couched conflates the new proposed standards with increased innovation, invention and economic prosperity (Neuwelt et al. 2015) . Evidence for such a relationship is at best varied and
contingent. Yet the official Australian website claims unambiguous benefits from "a strong intellectual property regime".
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Australia was a "friend of intellectual property" in the Uruguay Round negotiations which led to TRIPS. The reasons are unclear. The rational position for a country with Australia's negative balance on licensing fees and royalties 3 would be to oppose any broadening of the patent system.
The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) has never justified the position Australia took and still appears not to understand that changes to the patent system impact on the economy as a whole (Productivity Commission 2010: 262-264). Given ample warnings about the potential negative impacts of intellectual property provisions from the nation's expert body, it would seem that, on patent-related issues, DFAT suffers more from a case of 'willful blindness' than from 'failure to understand'.
The paper proceeds with a brief discussion of the key elements of a balanced patent policy -one that aims to provide incentives for useful new technology that would not otherwise not occur, without impeding other inventors or creating higher than necessary costs. This is compared with the patent policy prescriptions which Australia promoted as a friend of TRIPS. In section 3 the patent and data protection provisions of AUSFTA are discussed and compared with balanced provisions and the TRIPS provisions. The AUSFTA patent policy changes are then traced through subsequent Australian trade agreements (Section 4). The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of unbalanced patent policy and a consideration of whether the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations will see yet further imbalance.
Balanced patent policy and the TRIPS Agreement
The patent system is complex, rife with specialized language, and many ordinary words take highly specialised meanings. These factors operate to exclude many analysts from attempting to understand the patent system. But its essence is very simple. It is a bargain between society and inventors to provide 20-year monopolies in exchange for beneficial new knowledge. The underlying assumption is that the benefits from the new knowledge (dynamic efficiency gains)
will exceed the losses from reduced competition (static efficiency losses).
Because the patent incentive operates by stopping other inventors from exploiting their independent inventions, it needs to be designed carefully. 4 An efficient patent system would grant patents only to those inventions which would not have occurred without the patent incentive and which provide sufficient social benefit to offset the losses from granting the monopoly. Both qualifiers are important and warrant further explanation. And it is certain that the social cost of the many minor patents surrounding a blockbuster drugdelaying generic competition -more than exceeds any benefits. Such evergreening patents take • limiting patents to inventions which would not otherwise occur (proxied by a technology limit, which partly aligns with high development costs);
• ensuring that real inventiveness is required (as this is a proxy for the societal benefit of new knowledge); and
• limiting privileges to sale in the market where the patent holds (to minimize unnecessary damage to competition).
As we will see, the TRIPS agreement, while not perfect, left countries significant scope to pusrue a balanced patent policy approach.
The TRIPS Agreement
TRIPS was one of the most contentious aspects of the Uruguay Round trade negotiations. Partly as a result of this, the treaty has a certain degree of balance, incorporating safeguards such as an objectives statement. Article 7 reads as though it was written particularly for patent policy:
"The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations." (TRIPS Article 7).
Most patent systems fail this standard. Their inventiveness standard is so low that many granted patents deliver only costs not benefits (Moir 2013b). By ignoring the technology limitation, they grant patents that would have occurred anyway. A plethora of complex rules tilt the whole system in favour of patent grant (FTC 2003: 8) .
One policy element that is fundamental to ensuring balance in a patent system is limitation to technology. This premise is so basic that it has rarely been written down. Its absence has allowed courts, both in the USA and in Australia, to broaden the scope of patent policy in ways that were never envisioned by lawmakers and have never been subjected to any evidence-based analysis.
Key business participants in the advisory structures of the Office of the US Trade Representative gain considerable profits from the extension of patents to non-technology areas such as software, and TRIPS+ patent proposals often embody such extensions. This is in contrast to the clear language in TRIPS that allows countries to limit patent policy to technological inventions. 8 Indeed TRIPS clearly specifies that software developments should be granted copyright protection (Article 10). TRIPS allows countries the sovereign right to limit patents to technological inventions. It also allows other exclusions from patentability -diagnostic and other methods for the treatment of humans or animals; and plants and animals. By strongly enforcing the limitation of patents to technological inventions, a patent system can approximate a limitation to inventions with high development costs -those which would not occur in the absence of patents. This increases the efficiency and effectiveness of a patent system and acts to reduce unbalanced outcomes.
TRIPS also allows full flexibility in implementing the compulsory patentability criteria of novelty, inventiveness and utility. Where there is not a direct benefit, such as improved health outcomes, it is the new knowledge or know-how embodied in a patented invention which is the principle benefit society gains to offset the monopoly costs. A high inventiveness standard acts to limit unnecessary monopolies, which incur costs but provide no benefits.
A There is one major area where TRIPS presents an impediment to achieving balance in a patent system. TRIPS mandates a very broad range of privileges for patent holders. WTO compliant patents allow the holder to prevent third parties from "making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes" the patented item. Such sweeping privileges widen the anticompetitive effects of patent systems and go well beyond the incentives needed to induce inventions which would not otherwise occur. AUSFTA deals with patent issues in a single article (Article 17.9), with 15 sub-sections and multiple sub-sub-sections (Table 1) . It starts with the very unbalanced requirement that patentable inventions must now include "any new uses or methods of using a known product". The TRIPS exclusion of plants and animals is dropped. Both provisions re-appear in the TPP negotiations.
Neither required any policy change in Australia, but both are symptomatic of an unbalanced system.
Where a product has been previously patented it has been provided with the right of preventing all commercial uses of that product for up to 20 years. 12 This includes preventing all methods of commercial use. So a new patent for a specific use of a known thing is double-dipping. It supports evergreening -pharmaceutical patents for 'inventions' such as new forms, dosages and methods of use of known compounds. They have very low levels of inventiveness but can substantially delay generic competition (Moir and Palombi 2013). Such patents are unlikely to provide any health improvements. But they do radically increase the cost to Australian taxpayers and consumers through the delayed entry of generic pharmaceuticals. Writing these domestic regulatory details into an international treaty ties the hands of future governments with respect to options for patent reform.
As noted above TRIPS provides extensive privileges to a patent holder. AUSFTA further extends these (Table 1) . AUSFTA prevents parallel importation, specifically limits the use of patent information before patent expiry to a single ground and provides patent term extensions to offset delays in both patent processing and marketing approval. None of these limitations are in TRIPS.
While TRIPS provisions on compulsory licenses (CLs) are extensive, they are not highly prescriptive. The AUSFTA provisions substantially narrow the range of circumstances when
CLs can be used. The AUSFTA text removes anti-competitive conduct as a ground for revoking a patent. This text has no effect, as a side letter allows revocation due to anti-competitive conduct as long as this follows a judicial proceeding. This approach of writing details into treaty text, but then negating them though separate documents allows the text to be used to demonstrate commitments which have not actually been made. In agreeing to this deceitful strategy, Australia provides support to the US to broaden agreement to a limitation which it will not itself agree.
AUSFTA covers many other patent matters on which TRIPS is silent. These are both procedural (grace periods and amendments), and substantive (full disclosure and fair basis). 13 AUSFTA mandates the US definition of 'utility' -this "specific, substantial and credible" approach is contentious (Thambisetty 2009). Finally, AUSFTA contains commitments to reduce differences in law and practice, participate in international patent harmonisation efforts and establish a framework to progress towards mutual exploitation of search and examination work.
Prior to AUSFTA, Australia already had a very unbalanced patent system, strongly favouring the interests of patent-holders over consumers and other users of technology. The breadth of the patent system had been widened through judicial action; the very low inventiveness standard fell further, again due to judicial action (Lawson 2007); and granted privileges were extensive, particularly for pharmaceuticals. In other words the Australian patent system was very like that in the USA. By writing bad policy into an international treaty, AUSFTA substantially increases impediments to much-needed reform in both Australia and the USA. The data that must be protected are data that demonstrate whether or not a product is safe and more efficacious than a placebo. As it would be unethical to require generic manufacturers to undertake duplicate clinical trials, 17 limiting their use by other parties has the effect of potentially delaying generic entry to the market. In many ways this government benefit provides a more robust support to pharmaceutical profitability than do patents. Patents can be challenged in court, but data protection provisions cannot. 
Other Australian trade agreements: amplifying imbalance
Since 2003 Australia has concluded preferential trade agreements with Singapore, Thailand, the USA, Chile, Malaysia, ASEAN and New Zealand, Korea and Japan. An agreement with China has been announced, but at the time of writing no details about content were available.
All these preferential agreements are 'comprehensive' -they deal with matters well beyond trade and investment. All have IP provisions. These generally focus on copyright, especially in an electronic context; trademarks; enforcement of copyrights and trademarks; and general cooperation. Only a few address patent and data protection policy.
Some address relatively minor patent matters -such as grace periods and classification systems, while others address important issues of balance such as opposition and revocation procedures (see Table 1 ).
Of more importance in achieving balance in patent policy are opposition and revocation provisions, requirements about what must be granted patents, and full disclosure. Korea -which also has an FTA with the USA -repeats the AUSFTA requirement to grant patents for "any new uses or methods of using a known product", thus extending the breadth of the patent system. As with AUSFTA, KAFTA limits the grounds for revocation of a patent, and specifies the details for full disclosure. Again the hand of the US is evident in these provisions. The Chile agreement simply allows for both revocation and opposition. Such procedures are critical elements of balance, allowing well-funded competitors to challenge patent whish should not have been granted.
The Malaysia Australia Free Trade Agreement (MAFTA) includes a major TRIPS+ issue that goes beyond the AUSFTA provisions or anything yet demanded by the USA: the introduction of presumptive validity for patents. Presumptive validity creates a higher threshold of proof for anyone wanting to challenge the validity of a patent. This provision is despite the fact that the Australian patent statute specifically states that a patent granted in Australia cannot be presumed valid. 18 As DFAT claims to work on the basis of current domestic policy in negotiating IP provisions this commitment is astonishing. In the USA the presumption of patent validity has been a major impediment to the challenge of patents with very little inventiveness 
Implications, including for the TPP, and alternative ways forward
One of the most important facts about free trade is that it is domestic reforms which deliver the most benefit; improved market access is a minor gain to very limited sections of the community. 19 The reason is that domestic reforms increase competition and so reduce costs across the board, benefitting consumers and businesses alike. Tariff barriers act to increase prices. It has been repeatedly documented that the national cost of supporting an industry through tariff barriers is substantially greater than the national cost of supporting the same level of industrial activity through direct subsidies. 20 Recent analyses of the impact of pharmaceutical product patents show that patents operate very like tariff barriers. They protect producer monopolies with consequent high prices. There are three recent economic studies with show that, as with tariffs, it would be far cheaper to directly subsidise pharmaceutical research than to grant them patents.
Branstetter and colleagues (2011) estimate the consumer surplus generated in the USA by policies which facilitate early generic entry to the pharmaceutical market. 21 They estimate consumer gains at around UA$92 billion, and producers losses at some US$14 billion. Clearly the price paid by consumers is far greater than the benefit received by producers. The USA would benefit considerably if it reformed its patent system to minimise evergreening and ensure early While these three studies focus on only one aspect of patent policy they demonstrate clearly that the social cost of patent policy is both absolutely high and substantially higher than the cost of alternative more efficient policies. The gains to producers are between an eighth and a sixth of the cost to consumers. As with tariff barriers, it would be far more efficient to directly subsidise pharmaceutical production than to grant product patents. It is deeply ironic, therefore, that such patent monopolies are required as part of the WTO's 'free trade' suite of agreements.
It was powerful lobby groups who played the key role in establishing global norms on patents Of 27 TRIPS+ changes to patent policy agreed by Australia in preferential trade agreements, 21
were first introduced in the AUSFTA (Table 1) . Two of these might be of benefit to users of new technologies, depending on how they are implemented. These are changes to the disclosure requirements and the requirement for pre-or post grant opposition processes. Depending on how the public education provisions operate, they may solely benefit rights-holders or they may also address user concerns. The other 24 changes all operate in the interests of patent owners.
Two of the TRIPS+ provisions extend the reach of the patent system, requiring patentability for things that did not have to be patented under TRIPS.
Others provide for even more extended patent owner privileges. AUSFTA provisions reduce competition during the patent term (by eliminating the right of parallel importation), restrict use of patent information before expiry, further limit use of compulsory licenses (in itself a rare event), extend patent terms (in specific circumstances) and create far stronger data exclusivity provisions. Together these add to a significant delay in the entry of competitors into the market.
Estimating the welfare impact of delayed competition requires access to substantial data, not generally available. We do however have some indirect evidence on the issue -the behaviour of problems arising from the low inventiveness requirement and the extension of patents to fields that were previously unpatentable (notably software and generic discoveries).
By bringing current low patentability standards into the AUSFTA and agreeing to a wide range of increases in the privileges granted to patent holders the Howard Government limited the capacity of all future governments to reform the patent system. The data exclusivity and patent linkage provisions created new policy, solely of benefit to patent-holders, and with direct implications for the cost of pharmaceuticals to Australians, including taxpayers.
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Few of the TRIPS+ provisions in the AUSFTA are reflected in Australia's other preferential trade agreements ( Table 1) . The most frequent patent-related matters in Australia's other agreements are 'education' and co-operation (especially with respect to search and examination). There is also a trend towards establishing oversight committees.
The AUSFTA text was largely written by the USA. The leaked IP text of the proposed TPP 23 reflects US authorship too, with the hand of the pharmaceutical industry clearly evident. Many of the provisions in the AUSFTA are evident in the draft TPP (see Table 2 ). The TPP thus attempts to broaden the number of nations agreeing to TRIPS+ provisions, but with a more demanding agenda than AUSFTA. This ratcheting down of patent standards to even lower levels of inventiveness is clear in the US and Japanese proposal that patents may not be denied solely because they do not "result in enhanced efficacy of the known product" (Article E.1(a)). This wording is clearly designed to remove limits to pharmaceutical patents such as that used in Section 3(d) of the Indian Patent Act. 24 This wording clearly indicates that -all protestations to the contrary -the standard for patent grant is far too low.
The TPP also seeks to extend the monopoly privileges granted to patent owners, with all but two of the extensions in the AUSFTA re-appearing in the TPP (Table 2) . 25 Some of the moves towards greater harmonisation that were evident in the AUSFTA also re-appear in the TPP. But of the six items that appear in Australia's other agreements (items 22 to 27 in Table 1) that there is no harm in agreeing to provisions which simply mirror current practice is based on the entirely false premise that the current system is worth preserving forever. In Australia, an immediate pause on harmonisation efforts to allow a thorough review of the current system is the first step towards nationally beneficial reform. While TRIPS mandates a patent system, it also requires that it be balanced. A patent review might take as its starting point the breadth of the system and the inventiveness requirement -both substantially increase the costs of a patent system without providing any discernable benefit to Australian inventors and innovators. Use US "specific, substantial and credible" utility criteria 9. 13 19 Reduce differences in law and practice 9. 14 20 Participate in international harmonisation 9.14 21
Framework for mutual use of search and examination results has not yet moved to prevent this. 
